Anton's Journal: 03/01/2015

…Мы рождены, чтоб сказку сделать былью. © Американские генетики сообщили о научном прорыве: им удалось вставить 14 генов вымерших мамонтов в ДНК слона

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Небольшой сумбур после просмотра фильма…

Посмотрел фильм Kill the Messenger. Фильм основан на реальных фактах. История о том, как в США “раскручивался” один из самых громких скандалов в современной Истории США

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Saturday, March 21, 2015

Rise of the Drones…

Интересный фильм. Документальный. Нашел по рекомендации Александры

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Friday, March 20, 2015

Книга для современных детей и родителей…

Очень занимательная книга… ИНСПЕКТОР ЛЮСЬКИН (Глава первая. Въездная) Однажды под осень, когда листья с деревьев уже облетели, а с кустов еще нет, когда снег уже с неба падал, но на земле еще не лежал, мама позвонила дяде Федору в Простоквашино и сказала: — Слушай, у меня тут старый диван кожаный образовался

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Любопытная статья о происходящем на Украине…

В общем-то, статья с иным мнением и совершенно выбивающаяся из общего хора статей на эту тему с данного сайта.

Нужно сказать, что сайт этот никак нельзя назвать пророссийским.

Ukraine is considered by geostrategists (both Republican and Democratic) to be militarily the most important adjoining nation to Russia, serving as the chief buffer to attacks against Russia from the west. Since 1783, Russia has had its key Black Sea naval base located in Crimea, which used to be part of Russia 1783-1954; the Soviet Union's Nikita Khrushchev blithely donated Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, though the residents in Crimea didn't want that — and no referendum was taken on it. After the Soviet Union broke up in 1992, this naval base continued but instead on a long-term lease from Ukraine.

For Ukraine to become anti-Russian would be like for Mexico to become anti-American: even worse than when Cuba became anti-American in 1959. Mexico, of course, isn't anti-American, but, during Barack Obama's second term, Ukraine did, indeed, become anti-Russian. It happened not via any democratic revolution (such as American propaganda pretended), but via a bloody coup. Here is how it transpired:

After Mr. Obama (who had been raised surrounded by CIA operatives) finally became elected to a second term, he switched his key official controlling Ukrainian policy from the benign internationalist Philip Gordon, who considered America's chief enemy to be global jihadism, to the hard-right America-supremacist Victoria Nuland, who considers America's chief enemy to be instead the nation of Russia.

Nuland had originally been brought into Bill Clinton's Administration when the nationalistic Russia-hater Strobe Talbott in Clinton's State Department made her his Chief of Staff; she then became Vice President Dick Cheney's foreign-affairs advisor, and was brought back again into the State Department by Hillary Clinton in 2011. In September 2013, Nuland was promoted to become Obama's Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, working under John Kerry, and she promptly set herself to the task of overthrowing the democratically elected pro-Russian Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych — to turn Ukraine from pro-Russian to anti-Russian.

Here is Nuland, speaking by phone with Obama's Ambassador to Ukraine, on 4 February 2014, telling him whom to get to be appointed as the leader of Ukraine after the democratically elected pro-Russian President of Ukraine will be overthrown on 22 February 2014, which happened just 18 days later in a very bloody coup. The man she chose, "Yats," got the appointment. The founder of the "private CIA" firm Stratfor has said that this was "the most blatant coup in history." The Czech President has said that "only poorly informed people" don't know that it was a coup and equate it with Czechoslovakia's authentically democratic 1968 "Velvent Revolution" against the Soviet Union. Instead of the tactful "poorly informed," the simple reality is: deceived. The American public are deceived.

Here is a member of Ukraine's parliament, or Rada, speaking on 20 November 2013, prior to the start of "Maidan" demonstrations against Yanukovych, and even before Yanukovych had announced that he would turn down the EU's offer to Ukraine, in which this parliamentarian is describing in remarkable detail the preparations that the U.S. Embassy already had underway to produce a coup which would bring down Yanukovych and replace him with a leader who would be controlled from Washington. Hackers had gotten into the American Embassy's emails, and this parliamentarian reported what they had discovered. He says:

"American instructors explained there how social networks and Internet technologies can be used for targeted manipulation of public opinion as well as to activate potential protest to provoke violent unrest on the territory of Ukraine — radicalization of the population, and triggering of infighting. American instructors show examples of successful use of social networks to organize protests in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. 'Tech Camp' representatives currently hold conferences throughout Ukraine. A total of five events have been held so far."

This plan was built upon something that the previous Ambassador (whom Obama had appointed in 2009) had actually started even before Nuland was appointed. Here is an announcement from the Embassy in Ukraine, on 1 March 2013, titled, "U.S. Embassy Hosted TechCamp Kyiv 2.0 to Build Technological Capacity of Civil Society." (That Ambassador is now our Ambassador to Russia.)

Steve Weissman at Reader Supported News provided, a year ago, on 25 March 2014, the best backgrounder on the man whom Obama chose in 2013 to serve as America's new Ambassador in Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, the person who worked with Nuland, and it is clear from his background that he was the perfect person on the ground in Kiev to carry out the instructions from an extreme nationalist and imperialist such as Nuland.

So: this was a coup, arranged in the White House. It was Obama to Kerry to Nuland to Pyatt.

Here is the phone-conversation right after the coup, in which the Foreign Affairs chief of the EU receives from her investigator in Kiev, his finding as to what had happened — that it was a coup and not a democratic overthrow, not a democratic revolution at all.

Vladimir Putin knew about all of these things while they were happening. He knew that Obama was clearly set upon attacking Russia and on using Ukraine as the proxy-state to get the conflict going. He acted promptly on this knowledge: For example, he sent an advanced ABM missile system to Crimea — suitable to shoot down planes or anything — to prevent the Ukrainian Air Force from attacking Crimea in the lead-up to the 16 Marcch 2014 referendum.

As I have pointed out previously, the population of Crimea, both before and after the coup, wanted very much to return to Russia. The 96% vote for that in the 16 March 2014 Crimean referendum turns out to be exactly concordant with the Gallup polls that the U.S. Government commissioned and that were taken both before and after the referendum. Gallup found overwhelming public support in Crimea for returning to Russia, and found that overwhelmingly the 500 Crimeans who were sampled after the referendum thought that the 96% vote for returning to Russia was authentically reflecting Crimean opinion on the matter.

Now, with that as the actual history of America's aggression against Russia during President Obama's second term, consider that, on 16 March 2015, which was the first anniversary of the referendum in Crimea, Jen Psaki, at the U.S. State Department headlined, "One Year Later — Russia's Occupation of Crimea," and she said:

"On this one year anniversary of the sham 'referendum' in Crimea, held in clear violation of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution, the United States reiterates its condemnation of a vote that was not voluntary, transparent, or democratic. We do not, nor will we, recognize Russia's attempted annexation and call on President Putin to end his country's occupation of Crimea."

This is the way that the U.S., which is occupying Ukraine (by coup), talks about Russia, which protected the Crimeans from being subjected to the hell that the people in Donbass are now experiencing from the Ukrainian Occupying Regime, no legal Government at all. And, for that — the sheer illegality of what Obama did — just read this. Then consider that Obama is demanding that the entirely undemocratic and forced transfer of Crimea by the Soviet dictator Khrushchev in 1954 must stand as being legal, while this entirely democratic plebiscite on the issue in 2014 must be called "not voluntary, transparent, or democratic." That takes some nerve (and a deceived public).

Ms. Psaki continues with her string of lies, including:

"Over the last year, the human rights situation in Crimea has deteriorated dramatically, with mounting repression of minority communities and faiths, in particular Crimean Tatars, and systematic denial of fundamental freedoms. Local residents have been detained, interrogated, and disappeared and NGOs and independent media have been driven out of the peninsula. These brutalities are unacceptable and we call on Russia to stop further abuses."

She describes the situation in Crimea as if it were instead the actual situation in Donbass, with all of the U.S. Government's stooge-regime bombing and even firebombing the residents there in order to, simply, get rid of them.

Adolf Hitler could learn a thing or two from this man O'Bomba.

Obama is the aggressor here, just as Hitler was the aggressor in Poland in 1939. And O'Bomba blames Russia as the aggressor, just as Hitler blamed Poland.

Obama overthrew the legal Government, and replaced it by this illegal one. But now he criticizes Putin as if he were the aggressor instead of the defender here. And Obama demands that the Soviet dictator's forced transfer of Crimea to Ukraine be legal and that Putin's defense of Crimeans' democratic self-determination in response to that coup be considered illegal.

It's the Big Lie, all over again, but this time backed by, and yet also up against, nuclear weapons, and thus far more dangerous than before.

How did America manage to be headed by such a monster? We Americans need to ponder that. This isn't a partisan issue. I voted for Obama both times, as the lesser of two evils. But now both Parties are outright rotten. This is not a democracy any longer. Illusions to the contrary must end — and soon. Before we get to World War III.

Investigative historian Eric Zuesse is the author, most recently, of They're Not Even Close: The Democratic vs. Republican Economic Records, 1910-2010, and of CHRIST'S VENTRILOQUISTS: The Event that Created Christianity, and of Feudalism, Fascism, Libertarianism and Economics.

Отсюда.

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Wednesday, March 18, 2015

Попытка понять Путина…

…И Россию…

Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia’s Decline

Ukraine is, of course, the place to start. The country is vital to Russia as a buffer against the West and as a route for delivering energy to Europe, which is the foundation of the Russian economy. On Jan. 1, Ukraine’s president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally regarded as favorably inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a Russian puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his supporters, fundamental Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.

This was extremely important to Putin. Part of the reason Putin had replaced Boris Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin’s performance during the Kosovo war. Russia was allied with the Serbs and had not wanted NATO to launch a war against Serbia. Russian wishes were disregarded. The Russian views simply didn’t matter to the West. Still, when the air war failed to force Belgrade’s capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that allowed U.S. and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As part of that settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part in peacekeeping in Kosovo. But the Russians were never allowed to take up that role, and Yeltsin proved unable to respond to the insult.

Putin also replaced Yeltsin because of the disastrous state of the Russian economy. Though Russia had always been poor, there was a pervasive sense that it been a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become even poorer and was now held in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with both issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power, though he said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. This did not mean he wanted to resurrect the Soviet Union in its failed form, but rather that he wanted Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he wanted to protect and enhance Russian national interests.

The breaking point came in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004. Yanukovich was elected president that year under dubious circumstances, but demonstrators forced him to submit to a second election. He lost, and a pro-Western government took office. At that time, Putin accused the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having organized the demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation, sending it the way of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine’s importance to Russia was self-evident. He therefore believed that the CIA organized the demonstration to put Russia in a dangerous position, and that the only reason for this was the overarching desire to cripple or destroy Russia. Following the Kosovo affair, Putin publicly moved from suspicion to hostility to the West.

The Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo the Orange Revolution. They worked to rebuild the Russian military, focus their intelligence apparatus and use whatever economic influence they had to reshape their relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn’t control Ukraine, they did not want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe. This was, of course, not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal one.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia had more to do with Ukraine than it had to do with the Caucasus. At the time, the United States was still bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Washington had no formal obligation to Georgia, there were close ties and implicit guarantees. The invasion of Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to show the region that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was able to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region, and particularly to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or implicit, had no value. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president of Ukraine, reversing the Orange Revolution and limiting Western influence in the country.

Recognizing the rift that was developing with Russia and the general trend against the United States in the region, the Obama administration tried to recreate older models of relationships when Hillary Clinton presented Putin with a “reset” button in 2009. But Washington wanted to restore the relationship in place during what Putin regarded as the “bad old days.” He naturally had no interest in such a reset. Instead, he saw the United States as having adopted a defensive posture, and he intended to exploit his advantage.

One place he did so was in Europe, using EU dependence on Russian energy to grow closer to the Continent, particularly Germany. But his high point came during the Syrian affair, when the Obama administration threatened airstrikes after Damascus used chemical weapons only to back off from its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed Obama’s move, proposing a process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged from the crisis appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite of a weakening economy, this boosted Putin’s standing.

The Tide Turns Against Putin

Events in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have proved devastating to Putin. In January, Russia dominated Ukraine. By February, Yanukovich had fled the country and a pro-Western government had taken power. The general uprising against Kiev that Putin had been expecting in eastern Ukraine after Yanukovich’s ouster never happened. Meanwhile, the Kiev government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By July, the Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These included Crimea, where the Russians had always held overwhelming military force by virtue of treaty, and a triangle of territory from Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a small number of insurgents apparently supported by Russian special operations forces controlled a dozen or so towns.

If no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin’s strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to unravel of its own accord and to split the United States from Europe by exploiting Russia’s strong trade and energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of the Malaysia Airlines jet is crucial. If it turns out — as appears to be the case — that Russia supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man them (since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia could be held responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means Moscow’s ability to divide the Europeans from the Americans would decline. Putin then moves from being an effective, sophisticated ruler who ruthlessly uses power to being a dangerous incompetent supporting a hopeless insurrection with wholly inappropriate weapons. And the West, no matter how opposed some countries might be to a split with Putin, must come to grips with how effective and rational he really is.

Meanwhile, Putin must consider the fate of his predecessors. Nikita Khrushchev returned from vacation in October 1964 to find himself replaced by his protege, Leonid Brezhnev, and facing charges of, among other things, “harebrained scheming.” Khrushchev had recently been humiliated in the Cuban missile crisis. This plus his failure to move the economy forward after about a decade in power saw his closest colleagues “retire” him. A massive setback in foreign affairs and economic failures had resulted in an apparently unassailable figure being deposed.

Russia’s economic situation is nowhere near as catastrophic as it was under Khrushchev or Yeltsin, but it has deteriorated substantially recently, and perhaps more important, has failed to meet expectations. After recovering from the 2008 crisis, Russia has seen several years of declining gross domestic product growth rates, and its central bank is forecasting zero growth this year. Given current pressures, we would guess the Russian economy will slide into recession sometime in 2014. The debt levels of regional governments have doubled in the past four years, and several regions are close to bankruptcy. Moreover, some metals and mining firms are facing bankruptcy. The Ukrainian crisis has made things worse. Capital flight from Russia in the first six months stood at $76 billion, compared to $63 billion for all of 2013. Foreign direct investment fell 50 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. And all this happened in spite of oil prices remaining higher than $100 per barrel.

Putin’s popularity at home soared after the successful Sochi Winter Olympics and after the Western media made him look like the aggressor in Crimea. He has, after all, built his reputation on being tough and aggressive. But as the reality of the situation in Ukraine becomes more obvious, the great victory will be seen as covering a retreat coming at a time of serious economic problems. For many leaders, the events in Ukraine would not represent such an immense challenge. But Putin has built his image on a tough foreign policy, and the economy meant his ratings were not very high before Ukraine.

Imagining Russia After Putin

In the sort of regime that Putin has helped craft, the democratic process may not be the key to understanding what will happen next. Putin has restored Soviet elements to the structure of the government, even using the term “Politburo” for his inner Cabinets. These are all men of his choosing, of course, and so one might assume they would be loyal to him. But in the Soviet-style Politburo, close colleagues were frequently the most feared.

The Politburo model is designed for a leader to build coalitions among factions. Putin has been very good at doing that, but then he has been very successful at all the things he has done until now. His ability to hold things together declines as trust in his abilities declines and various factions concerned about the consequences of remaining closely tied to a failing leader start to maneuver. Like Khrushchev, who was failing in economic and foreign policy, Putin could have his colleagues remove him.

It is difficult to know how a succession crisis would play out, given that the constitutional process of succession exists alongside the informal government Putin has created. From a democratic standpoint, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin are as popular as Putin is, and I suspect they both will become more popular in time. In a Soviet-style struggle, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov and Security Council Chief Nicolai Patryushev would be possible contenders. But there are others. Who, after all, expected the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev?

Ultimately, politicians who miscalculate and mismanage tend not to survive. Putin miscalculated in Ukraine, failing to anticipate the fall of an ally, failing to respond effectively and then stumbling badly in trying to recoup. His management of the economy has not been exemplary of late either, to say the least. He has colleagues who believe they could do a better job, and now there are important people in Europe who would be glad to see him go. He must reverse this tide rapidly, or he may be replaced.

Putin is far from finished. But he has governed for 14 years counting the time Dmitri Medvedev was officially in charge, and that is a long time. He may well regain his footing, but as things stand at the moment, I would expect quiet thoughts to be stirring in his colleagues’ minds. Putin himself must be re-examining his options daily. Retreating in the face of the West and accepting the status quo in Ukraine would be difficult, given that the Kosovo issue that helped propel him to power and given what he has said about Ukraine over the years. But the current situation cannot sustain itself. The wild card in this situation is that if Putin finds himself in serious political trouble, he might become more rather than less aggressive. Whether Putin is in real trouble is not something I can be certain of, but too many things have gone wrong for him lately for me not to consider the possibility. And as in any political crisis, more and more extreme options are contemplated if the situation deteriorates.

Those who think that Putin is both the most repressive and aggressive Russian leader imaginable should bear in mind that this is far from the case. Lenin, for example, was fearsome. But Stalin was much worse. There may similarly come a time when the world looks at the Putin era as a time of liberality. For if the struggle by Putin to survive, and by his challengers to displace him, becomes more intense, the willingness of all to become more brutal might well increase.

Отсюда.

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Monday, March 16, 2015

“Аналитика” от Глена…

По поводу “исчезновения” Путина все очень странно. Вот только странность эта не со стороны Путина и власти, как мне представляется

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Любопытное интервью гостя с Запада…

…Интересно… – Так все же каким образом, на ваш взгляд, вступили в противоречие европейские ценности, украинский кризис и Россия

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Sunday, March 15, 2015

Оказывается, этим вопросом озаботились…

..Не только на Украине.. Я об этом. Мир, читающий CNN, тоже переживает. (CNN) Vladimir Putin is not a self-effacing man

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Вопрос, касающийся острейшей темы современности…

Что случится с этими людьми, когда Путин появится в телевизоре? Исчезновение с поля зрениям говорит о том, что в Российской Федерации, вполне вероятно, происходит передача власти, воз можно даже с сохранением «фасада»

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По жизни не везет…

Этому журналисту. Военный корреспондент “Радио Свобода” в Донбассе Андрей Бабицкий уволен в связи с публикацией информации о зверствах украинских националистов

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Friday, March 13, 2015

И никто таким как Путин, не может быть…

Веселая песенка… Вот интересно, кто сейчас больше всего “расручивает&

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Наследственность подкачала…

Я, как-то, это пропустил.. Кировский суд Астрахани приговорил к 10 годам колонии строгого режима отстраненного от должности мэра Астрахани Михаила Столярова

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Wednesday, March 11, 2015

Лучший игрок команды Portland “Trail Blazers”…

Статья на NBA.com The rebound was grabbed by LaMarcus Aldridge and forwarded out to Damian Lillard. By the time it reached Wesley Matthews, there was one step remaining in his season

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